In this special, jointly-hosted interview conducted on 10 September 2024, WA DEFENCE REVIEW Managing Editor Stephen Bunce and Adil Cader, Founder and Host of Talking Foreign Affairs, had the pleasure of speaking with the esteemed American diplomat Rose Gottemoeller, who served as Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from 2016 to 2019. Her term as NATO Deputy Secretary General saw her play a key role in addressing emerging security challenges in Europe. Over her career, Ms Gottemoeller has also served in the Obama Administration, first as the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (2009-14), during which she was the chief US negotiator for the New START Treaty with Russia, and then, in addition to that role, as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, between 2012 and 2016. Ms Gottemoeller is currently the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
SB: I’d like to thank you once again for working around the drastic time differences between Western Australia and California. Just to set the scene, in the first part of this interview, I will be looking to learn more of NATO’s relations with Australia and the alliance’s role in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, more generally.
In the second part of today’s interview, Adil will be discussing some of your reflections on recent commentary around NATO, Euro-Atlantic security and nuclear deterrence.
So, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan and New Zealand are global partners of NATO from the Indo-Pacific region. Please tell us more about NATO’s political dialogue and engagement strategy with its Indo-Pacific partners, and particularly with Australia.
I will be delighted to do so, but, as a first order of business, I’d like to give a great shout-out to my mentor, Dr Robert O’Neill, who has sadly left us now. But believe it or not, he was my first introduction to Euro-Atlantic strategy, as the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, when I arrived there in 1985 as a young research associate. I didn’t know anything about NATO, really, at that point; I’d been working at Rand Corporation on the USSR’s nuclear policy doctrine and force structure.
So, I have to say it was an Australian – and a very eminent Australian strategist – who introduced me to NATO. So, I did want to give that shout-out right at the beginning. Bob O’Neill was a great mentor, and I really loved working with him.
But, on to your question; you know, it’s really something that began in the fight against terrorism after 9-11. In the United States, NATO Member States joined together in the ‘War on Terror’ and that took them to Afghanistan, and it was in that context that an ever wider-ranging partnership was developed with partners in the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific, and that quickly included Australia and New Zealand.
During my time as Deputy Secretary General of NATO, we were still in Afghanistan, although on a smaller and smaller footprint. I recollect that Australia was playing an important role at that time and working closely with us as we were trying to prepare the Afghan Armed Forces for the departure of the United States and NATO, which was already foreseen by the negotiations that President Trump had underway, the so-called ‘Afghan peace process’ that was going on during my time at NATO.
It didn’t turn out so well, as we all know, but again, I just want to say that we had that long history from 9/11 and then practically all the way through, working with countries such as Australia in Afghanistan and in other aspects of the fight against terrorism. That was how I would say the partnership became well established, but, in more recent years, we have the rise of China and concerns about China and what it is doing in the Indo-Pacific. So that is pulling the partnership into, I would say, an even tighter focus than before.
SB: How would you characterise the nature of NATO’s present day operational and strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific regions and what are some of the challenges that are present?
Well, first I want to be very clear that NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and its centre of gravity is in the North Atlantic between North America and Europe. That is why it was founded and its continuing objective is ensuring a deterrence and defence of the Allies in Europe, as well as in North America.
Article 5 is the famous article in the founding treaty of NATO, the Washington Treaty of 1949. It essentially says that if one NATO ally is attacked, then all NATO allies must be ready to come to its aid. The only time it was invoked was in 2001, on September 11, when the United States was attacked in the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York. So, I do want to be clear that it’s about the defence, not only of Europe, but also of North America.
NATO does not have an area of military operations in the Indo-Pacific, but that doesn’t mean that individual major Member States don’t partner with countries in the Indo- Pacific. And, in fact, the United States has a formal alliance relationship with Australia that’s becoming ever more detailed and extensive.
Individual Member States do work together and, as with the NATO alliance, it works with its partners in Asia on particularly important tasks. We saw in the summit meeting this summer in Washington DC, on the 75th anniversary of NATO, that our partners in the Indo-Pacific agreed with NATO on really bringing forward certain tasks, such as how to make better use of the new and emerging technologies that are coming into the military sphere and working in that way together. But it is not as if NATO will be fighting in the Indo-Pacific as NATO. That is not going to happen.
SB: Please tell us – from NATO’s perspective – if and how the geo-strategic and geo-political circumstances facing the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are linked?
Well, we are facing two great authoritarian powers now. Russia and China have promulgated a terrible aggression against Ukraine, a war of, really, from this perspective, a war of choice. There was nobody threatening Russia.
That is despite what you might hear from Russian propagandists that NATO was threatening Russia; that was not true at all. NATO is a defensive alliance and, in fact, what NATO was doing during the Russian build-up – in 2021 was to try to warn the rest of the world and to warn the Ukrainians that they had a real problem gathering on their border.
It’s true that NATO has got its hands full in Europe, dealing with Vladimir Putin and assisting Ukraine, which is very important. The Asian partners of NATO have also been assisting Ukraine in various ways, with Australia included in that effort in the Indo-Pacific. Of course, China and the threats that it is now promulgating in the Indo Pacific under President Xi Jinping are very much in focus. The two sides of the world – that is, the NATO alliance and its partners in Asia – are thinking together about how to better tackle the quickly evolving risks and threats that are coming at us.
The war in Ukraine has shown us the amazing capability of autonomous vehicles of all kinds. Autonomous seaborne small boats and ships are being used to attack Russian targets in Crimea, and the Ukrainians have been great at developing those indigenous capabilities.
But it’s the whole notion of autonomous weapons systems that can be employed en mass because they’re not expensive, which is really going to be part of the concept of warfare in the future. I think NATO and its partners in the Indo-Pacific are all trying to get their heads around the lessons that we’re learning in Ukraine. In that way, they can work together, as I said, to take account of new technologies and how they are changing the way of war.
SB: As the chief negotiator of the New START Treaty, which was signed between the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 which called for the halving of strategic nuclear missile launchers and for new inspection and verification regimes to be established, please tell us about your personal experience with negotiating with the Russian Federation. With Moscow essentially suspending its participation (but not officially withdrawing from) New START in February 2023, and with the treaty expected to expire in February 2026, are you confident that nuclear arms reduction can remain a top-level priority for both NATO and non-NATO nuclear powers, despite the current environment of global conflict and instability?
I think it must be a top-level priority and the question is whether anybody else is going to come to the party, because, as you know, at the moment, both the Chinese and the Russians are refusing to talk to the United States and its NATO allies. They are refusing to even discuss further reductions beyond the New START Treaty, and both are modernising with some very concerning systems. The Russians have been showing off in Ukraine not only slower, smaller autonomous systems, but also gigantic hypersonic missiles that have enormous power and speed. So, we’ve got some big problems with Russia and China in terms of modernisation.
China is building up its nuclear forces from approximately 500 nuclear warheads today. The United States Department of Defense sees the fast pace of Chinese modernisation and says that they can be expected to have 1500 nuclear warheads by 2035, so that’s three times the number they have today.
With the fast pace of modernisation, the deployment of new technologies and the really threatening behaviour on the part of both of those countries, at the end of the day, they have to decide that it’s in their interest to come to the negotiating table. That’s why I think it’s so very important that the United States continues with its own nuclear modernisation, which, by the way, is not a build-up of nuclear forces at this point. It is a modernisation that is taking place under the limits of the New START Treaty. Under those limitations, the missiles and bombers number 700 on each side between Russia and the United States, and 1550 deployed nuclear warheads.
So, the US is modernising, but it’s to replace existing legacy systems and it’s under the limits of New START, but nevertheless we are sending a strong message to Russia and China that, if we have to increase, we will, and I think that has been very clear in recent US government statements. I think it is a message that needs to be out there so that they might start to think about whether that continuing build up is in their own interests: “Well, if the United States is threatening to build up, maybe we ought to start talking instead.”
I think that is the most important goal that the United States needs to be seeking at the present time. It needs to continue to modernise to show it can build up if it has to, but it also needs to keep the message out there that we are ready to negotiate. Having that kind of negotiated predictability is best for all concerned. If we’re in the midst of a nuclear arms race and everybody’s building up as fast as they can, and there’s no predictability and nobody knows when it’s all going to stop, well, first of all, we’re all going to waste a lot of money on terrible weapons of mass destruction, and second, we are going to be in much riskier circumstances than we are today, and in which there will be a real chance for nuclear instability and nuclear escalation.
SB: Given the massive significance of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, what is your take on its ability to deliver on its intentions to “promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable”, and for Australia to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines? Does the AUKUS Alliance and the apparent increased militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region suggest any concerns to you?
I have to be honest, I’m not the greatest expert on the current status of the AUKUS program, but I have to tell you quite honestly that I’ve also seen the Chinese sitting up to take notice. I think that is important. It’s part and parcel of the answer I gave a moment ago that I think it’s important to convey that we will defend our territorial integrity and sovereignty, especially in view of the way China is throwing around its weight in the South China Sea.
We can also see the way it’s been threatening the Philippines and, essentially, trying to take over. In the Philippines’ territorial waters, we’ve seen some absolutely egregious behaviour and I think it is important now to show that we are resolute and that we are also ready to defend ourselves, and the AUKUS program is part and parcel of that effort.
SB: Thank you, Rose, for your very insightful and considered responses. Now, I’ll pass it over to Adil Cader, who will further examine on thoughts on developments pertaining to the future of NATO, Euro-Atlantic security and nuclear deterrence.
AC: Thank you so much, Rose. Looking at some of your recent commentary, you’ve spoken about the strong bipartisan support for NATO and America, especially during President Trump’s administration. How do you think NATO can continue to maintain and strengthen public support in the US, particularly among younger generations?
It’s very important that NATO get its story out there and for the younger generation, that means going to where they are on social media platforms, going to universities and schools, talking to students, and trying to get them interested in NATO, through such initiatives as the NATO internship programme. I do find that there is a high level of interest among my students at Stanford; I’m trying to send as many of them as I can off to be interns at NATO.
But I do think it’s important to speak to young people in a way that they can understand and get the message across that NATO is an inherent part of their defence, and that it is really securing their future so that they can continue to live in peace and make their way in the world without having to worry about Russian aggression or attacks on the terrorist front.
I’ve been talking about NATO as being focused on deterrence and defence against Russia, but another main objective of NATO after September 11 is the continuing fight against terrorism, and we can’t forget that because we’re facing a newly aggressive Russia. We can’t forget that we must remain alert to the threat of terrorist attacks as well. So, NATO has those two missions very much in mind and it’s important to tell that whole story to young people.
AC: You mentioned young people, so just a bit of a plug as we transition into our next question and as our audience might be interested, Rose actually features in a Netflix documentary. That documentary is titled Turning Point: The Bomb and the Cold War, in which she gives some interesting commentary. I will post the link to that documentary when the interview is released, and we’d highly recommend it.
On to my next question, given your expertise in nuclear arms control, can you discuss how NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy has evolved in response to Russia’s nuclear threats and what challenges do you foresee in maintaining that strategy?
Yes, let me say a word right at the beginning about the so-called ‘extended nuclear deterrent’. It’s a difficult subject because it seems so horrific. These weapons are weapons of mass destruction, and they could destroy cities and kill millions of people with just one bomb, so, it’s a horrific capability and capacity.
But NATO moved to the notion of an extended nuclear deterrent in the 1950s, after the original post-World War II build-up and, of course, the first and only use, thank God, of a nuclear weapon in war, with the attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II.
Through the 1950s, there was a general notion of mutually assured destruction, meaning that “If you attack me with a nuclear bomb, I will attack you with a nuclear bomb and we will end up destroying each other”. Then, however, as the United States extended guarantees of security to NATO Europe, there was concern that there could be some gaming going on from Moscow and that the Soviet Union might attack, for example, Berlin or London, and then dare the United States to retaliate. If you attack back, in response to that attack on Berlin or London, you know that you will be sacrificing New York or Washington.
So, the big conundrum for the United States became whether it would be truly willing to trade Berlin for New York or Washington. And so, in that context, the United States, working together with its NATO allies, put in force the notion of an extended nuclear deterrent guarantee, and that means that the United States of America deploys some nuclear warheads in Europe. There are not many, around 100 or so, and the European allies participate in the delivery platforms, that is, they purchased dual capable aircraft. Now they’re purchasing the F-35 and they train and exercise in case the terrible day ever comes when Russia would attack Berlin or London. And then there would be a response that would come from Europe, and that would be the first attempts at trying to control any escalation, and trying to prevent it from turning into a global nuclear exchange that leads to the annihilation of the human race.
I think about it as a human extinction event, but the idea is be that there would be a measured response which would come from Europe; if the Russians attacked Europe, the response would come from Europe. So that’s what we call the extended nuclear security guarantee in Europe. It means that the United States controls the warheads, but the allies very much participate in the activity and train and exercise and prepare themselves again, should that terrible day ever come. But that’s what deterrence is all about, ensuring that that terrible day never comes.
AC: So, you spoke a little about NATO’s relationships with other countries and this ties into our next question, particularly some commentary you’ve given looking at the work done in the early 2000s in reference to the historical cooperation between NATO and Russia. What do you believe were the key turning points that led to the current breakdown in relations? And is there a potential path forwards to mend those strained relations?
That is a wonderful question, and it’s one I’ve been wrestling with every day because I remember people say, you know, Putin had it in for the United States and NATO from the very beginning. He was always aggressive and against any kind of dealings with the West, the political West as we call it, and that includes of course, countries like Australia and the Indo-Pacific; we include them in the political West in an ironic way.
But it was very clear to me that it was Putin who was the very first leader who called President George W. Bush on September 11 and offered Russian help in fighting terrorism to the American President. In 2002, he came to the so-called Rome Summit of NATO and he signed a document called the Rome Declaration that launched the NATO-Russia Council, which was supposed to be a very close-knit, cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, and it also launched about 12 years of very close project work; practical project work like fighting the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan and counter-drug operations that NATO and Russia were carrying out together. They were working on a common airspace initiative in Europe. So, very practical projects and NATO and Russia were working closely together.
Things started to go sour in the mid-2000s, and I think there were a couple of things that were going wrong. I think, in one way, Putin became alarmed because of the so-called colour revolutions that were going on. The Orange Revolution happened in Ukraine in 2004, and he could see that Ukraine was wanting to move closer to the West and was worried about democratic trends in Ukraine. And so, I think, he became more anti-democratic and opposed to countries in his neighbourhood, like Ukraine and Georgia, becoming members of NATO after those colour revolutions.
So, by 2008, when NATO declared at the Bucharest Summit that both Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members in the future, I think that, too, was part of what turned Putin and Russia in the wrong direction. But it’s not NATO’s fault. I want to emphasise that. NATO was trying all along to work closely with Russia and with the Kremlin, and with Vladimir Putin, and the feeling was that NATO could have both new members from Eastern Europe and from the neighbourhood of Russia, and it could also have a close and intense working relationship with Russia so that there would be some kind of mutual security structure and system built up that way. We used to call it “having security from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, meaning that nobody was going to be cut out of having that mutual security arrangement and Russia, of course, was not going to be cut out. That was the idea. It didn’t work.
AC: We’ve spoken a bit about the relationship between, as you mentioned, the Western Allies such as Australia, but something I’d like to briefly touch upon goes to about your recent commentary on the impact of President Putin’s nuclear drills.
How does that have an impact on the non-traditional Western countries, like India and Pakistan, and which doesn’t get that much commentary in international media in regard to nuclear power programs. How do you think the recent drills by President Putin would have affected the relationships with them?
It’s a great question again, because I think that those countries are, in some sense, trying to keep their heads down. They’re trying not to get pulled into the conflict on either side, and they’re also trying to benefit from it. We know that India has been buying vast amounts of oil products from Russia and has even been refining Russian oil to resell, sometimes on European markets, so the sanctions and attempts to control the oil market in Russia have not worked as well as they might. So India is benefiting from that.
But at the same time, I give Prime Minister Narendra Modi huge credit because, in October 2020, the Russians, I believe, were 50/50 as to whether or not they would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That’s an assessment that the US government had made at that time, and it got into the press. It’s been commented on in the media. So, there was a 50/50 chance that the Russians might have used nuclear weapons in Ukraine and at a big summit in Kazakhstan in November of 2022, both Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, and Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, said publicly to Vladimir Putin: do not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
To me, that was an extraordinary moment. These big guys are always very private with each other. They keep their disagreements private, and they talk to each other in the privacy of their palace corridors. But for them to say to Putin publicly, in that way, do not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, was, I think, a huge step and has essentially led the Russian President to back off from going nuclear in Ukraine.
SB: Rose, on behalf of Adil and myself we thank you once again for taking the time out of a busy schedule to join us at Talking Foreign Affairs and WA DEFENCE REVIEW for this interview.
Rose Gottemoeller is featured in the Netflix series “Turning Point: The Bomb and the Cold War.” This documentary provides a detailed exploration of the Cold War and its aftermath, with firsthand accounts and insights from prominent global figures.
