Key Points:
- Defence has been working on Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) for longer than it admits.
- While lessons from Ukraine and the Middle east are useful, Australia represents a very different geographic context – so those lessons must be applied carefully.
- Asymmetric advantage, speed to market and a minimum viable capability are now vital.
- Australia is having to reinvent its capability development and acquisition processes.
It’s a truth universally acknowledged (by most people, anyway) that Defence doesn’t have a clue what it is doing. Except that I suspect it does. What I’m about to say may sound naïve, even un-journalistic. But I rather suspect that, in certain cases, Defence is thinking ahead of the game, especially when it comes to Uncrewed Vehicles (UVs).
Innovation
There are a number of organisations in the defence organisation that are involved in innovation, including Defence’s Science and Technology Group, the RAAF’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation, Army’s RICO (don’t ask what that stands for) and Navy’s Maritime Integrated Capabilities organisation, which is headed by a DG Force Exploration.
And let’s not forget VCDF’s Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA), which in hindsight may have been a bit of a prototype for the transfer of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Capability Development process to the VCDF Group at Australian Defence Headquarters from 1 July this year.
All of these bodies have been involved in developing Uncrewed Air, Surface, Underwater and Ground Vehicles (collectively known as UXVs, or ‘drones’ if you insist), of one kind or another, for longer than they are admitting.
The conventional wisdom has been that Defence has ignored the lessons of Ukraine, the Red Sea and the Gulf, at least as they apply to UXVs. Meanwhile, we’re wasting far too much money developing nuclear-powered submarines and Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates that we won’t see for another six years, at least, which is denuding our budget for things we need more urgently, like UXVs and their payloads. (I might touch on the ADF’s lingering need for long-range submarines and ASW frigates in another article. For the time being, let’s think about UXVs).
But there’s a good reason why Defence doesn’t blindly follow (for the most part) examples from Ukraine and the Gulf: Australia is a continent 4,000km long and 3,200km wide, is responsible for a tenth of the earth’s surface and has Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) among our vital interests. We are big and our vital interests extend well beyond our shores, so range and speed matter more to us than they do to many other countries.
Whether you’re interdicting a hostile ship or submarine, launching an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform, or launching a loitering munition – or firing a counter-UAS asset or launching an interceptor to stop one of these – range and speed matter. So our requirements for UXVs differ sometimes markedly from other countries.
There’s another reason why Defence doesn’t blindly do what commentators suggest, which is to do what they do in Ukraine, or the Gulf. That would mean us fighting on equal terms with potential aggressors.
Asymmetric Advantage
What the ADF is looking for is asymmetric advantage, in both capability and cost, and in Australia’s context – very long distances and the need for situational awareness, speed and endurance. Obviously, it makes no sense to use a $3 million missile to shoot down a $50,000 hostile drone; one lesson the ADF has learned is that cheap UXVs need to be countered by cheap counter-measures, whether the threats come singly or in swarms. But the cost of the counter-measure also needs to be measured against the cost of the asset being protected.
All of the bodies listed earlier have focussed on different aspects of the UXV challenge, while ASCA is investing serious money (by its standards) on UXV capabilities and C-UXV technologies which have a defined route to market and which will be acquired by the Defence Delivery Group (DDG) if they are developed successfully.
So, the RAAF’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation has successfully tested the Aladdin logistics drone which can be launched from a C-130 Hercules in flight and carry a 35kg payload 5km to a pinpoint landing on land or on the flight deck of a frigate in Sea State 4. The RAAF, DSTG and ASCA have developed the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, which leads the world in Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) technologies: it has been tested in exercises on both sides of the Pacific with tactical fighters and Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft and has successfully destroyed air targets with air-air missiles.
It is the subject of a contract to develop a Block III version – the first production variant – with internal air-air and/or strike weapons. And it is being pitched now to Germany and the UK (and also, one suspects, to the USA).
Army’s Project LAND156 is a C-UAS program, headed by Leidos Australia with a core Command and Control (C2) system provided by Acacia Systems in Adelaide, various other sensors and with ASCA providing a range of effectors through its Mission Syracuse as technology matures and needs align.
At sea, the RAN, DSTG and ASCA have developed the autonomous Anduril Australia Ghost Shark XL-AUV and C2 Robotics Speartooth LUUV for a range of underwater missions – they are now entering service. Navy won’t talk about them or the payloads they carry (which deliver the majority of their effect), but they are capable of monitoring our vital undersea cables, tackling hostile submarines and submersibles and staying submerged for a long time. On the surface, the autonomous Ocius Bluebottle monitors surface and submarine traffic and stays at sea for months.
And ASCA has just announced a bunch of contracts to companies for undersea communications to enhance undersea C2.
On land RICO (among others, including the now-defunct Trusted Autonomy DCRC) is developing a range of autonomous Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGV) including an M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) based platform.
Speed to capability
The important thing about these capabilities is that they are only a small number of the total UXV projects that Defence is considering or working on. How many? It’s very hard to say, but at least as many again, based on what I’ve heard. And they are progressing quickly, or being tossed out quickly (and that matters, too).
The other point that Defence makes is that there’s no point in building 10,000 widgets which will sit on a shelf somewhere until they’re obsolete (possibly after just six months) and get thrown out – or, even worse, issued to the ADF because there’s nothing else available.
So Defence’s acquisition system needs to be fundamentally rethought: exports and collaboration with like-minded nations are imperative; speed to capability is vital; and so is the creation of a Minimum Viable Capability (MVC) to get something into the hands of the ADF that is subsequently refined and enhanced in light of operational experience. Defence needs a little bit of materiel on the shelf – but it really needs hot production lines that can deliver whatever the circumstances require.
By the way – UXVs are much cheaper than anything crewed, so although we’re spending just $7 billion over the next decade on UAVs and C-UAS systems, compared with what we’re spending on submarines and surface ships, we’re likely to get pretty good value for money.
World War or Cold War?
All of these things are happening, and they are (as far as I can see) good things. There’s a need for secrecy, which everybody gets, especially as the war drums beat louder: Australia could be at war within 12 months, or living with a new cold war for the next 40 years, so you don’t want to give away your country’s secrets.
But you wouldn’t know about any of this from listening to Defence: the department won’t state, argue or defend its case and then wonders why taxpayers and commentators express no confidence in it. It is possible to discuss capability plans in general terms without giving away anything of value, and the US are past masters at doing this. We could do worse than copy them.
There is a difference between secrecy and secretiveness and the latter leads to cynicism and disbelief – and that’s where Australian commentators are at the moment.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are that of the author’s only, and do not necessarily represent the views of WA DEFENCE REVIEW.
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY
Defence Sometimes Does Smart Things
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On 10 September 2024, the Australian Government announced the contract with Anduril Australia for $1.7 billion to acquire a new fleet of Australian designed and built extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle – known as the Ghost Shark – for the Royal Australian Navy. The Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Richard Marles MP; Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy MP and Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond AO RAN, announced the contract at Fleet Base East in Sydney. This investment will be for the delivery, maintenance and continued development of the Ghost Shark over the next five years and provide a significant boost to Australia’s undersea warfare capabilities. Source: Department of Defence. Photographer: Kym Smith.
Key Points:
It’s a truth universally acknowledged (by most people, anyway) that Defence doesn’t have a clue what it is doing. Except that I suspect it does. What I’m about to say may sound naïve, even un-journalistic. But I rather suspect that, in certain cases, Defence is thinking ahead of the game, especially when it comes to Uncrewed Vehicles (UVs).
Innovation
There are a number of organisations in the defence organisation that are involved in innovation, including Defence’s Science and Technology Group, the RAAF’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation, Army’s RICO (don’t ask what that stands for) and Navy’s Maritime Integrated Capabilities organisation, which is headed by a DG Force Exploration.
And let’s not forget VCDF’s Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA), which in hindsight may have been a bit of a prototype for the transfer of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Capability Development process to the VCDF Group at Australian Defence Headquarters from 1 July this year.
All of these bodies have been involved in developing Uncrewed Air, Surface, Underwater and Ground Vehicles (collectively known as UXVs, or ‘drones’ if you insist), of one kind or another, for longer than they are admitting.
The conventional wisdom has been that Defence has ignored the lessons of Ukraine, the Red Sea and the Gulf, at least as they apply to UXVs. Meanwhile, we’re wasting far too much money developing nuclear-powered submarines and Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates that we won’t see for another six years, at least, which is denuding our budget for things we need more urgently, like UXVs and their payloads. (I might touch on the ADF’s lingering need for long-range submarines and ASW frigates in another article. For the time being, let’s think about UXVs).
But there’s a good reason why Defence doesn’t blindly follow (for the most part) examples from Ukraine and the Gulf: Australia is a continent 4,000km long and 3,200km wide, is responsible for a tenth of the earth’s surface and has Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) among our vital interests. We are big and our vital interests extend well beyond our shores, so range and speed matter more to us than they do to many other countries.
Whether you’re interdicting a hostile ship or submarine, launching an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform, or launching a loitering munition – or firing a counter-UAS asset or launching an interceptor to stop one of these – range and speed matter. So our requirements for UXVs differ sometimes markedly from other countries.
There’s another reason why Defence doesn’t blindly do what commentators suggest, which is to do what they do in Ukraine, or the Gulf. That would mean us fighting on equal terms with potential aggressors.
Asymmetric Advantage
What the ADF is looking for is asymmetric advantage, in both capability and cost, and in Australia’s context – very long distances and the need for situational awareness, speed and endurance. Obviously, it makes no sense to use a $3 million missile to shoot down a $50,000 hostile drone; one lesson the ADF has learned is that cheap UXVs need to be countered by cheap counter-measures, whether the threats come singly or in swarms. But the cost of the counter-measure also needs to be measured against the cost of the asset being protected.
All of the bodies listed earlier have focussed on different aspects of the UXV challenge, while ASCA is investing serious money (by its standards) on UXV capabilities and C-UXV technologies which have a defined route to market and which will be acquired by the Defence Delivery Group (DDG) if they are developed successfully.
So, the RAAF’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation has successfully tested the Aladdin logistics drone which can be launched from a C-130 Hercules in flight and carry a 35kg payload 5km to a pinpoint landing on land or on the flight deck of a frigate in Sea State 4. The RAAF, DSTG and ASCA have developed the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, which leads the world in Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) technologies: it has been tested in exercises on both sides of the Pacific with tactical fighters and Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft and has successfully destroyed air targets with air-air missiles.
It is the subject of a contract to develop a Block III version – the first production variant – with internal air-air and/or strike weapons. And it is being pitched now to Germany and the UK (and also, one suspects, to the USA).
Army’s Project LAND156 is a C-UAS program, headed by Leidos Australia with a core Command and Control (C2) system provided by Acacia Systems in Adelaide, various other sensors and with ASCA providing a range of effectors through its Mission Syracuse as technology matures and needs align.
At sea, the RAN, DSTG and ASCA have developed the autonomous Anduril Australia Ghost Shark XL-AUV and C2 Robotics Speartooth LUUV for a range of underwater missions – they are now entering service. Navy won’t talk about them or the payloads they carry (which deliver the majority of their effect), but they are capable of monitoring our vital undersea cables, tackling hostile submarines and submersibles and staying submerged for a long time. On the surface, the autonomous Ocius Bluebottle monitors surface and submarine traffic and stays at sea for months.
And ASCA has just announced a bunch of contracts to companies for undersea communications to enhance undersea C2.
On land RICO (among others, including the now-defunct Trusted Autonomy DCRC) is developing a range of autonomous Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGV) including an M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) based platform.
Speed to capability
The important thing about these capabilities is that they are only a small number of the total UXV projects that Defence is considering or working on. How many? It’s very hard to say, but at least as many again, based on what I’ve heard. And they are progressing quickly, or being tossed out quickly (and that matters, too).
The other point that Defence makes is that there’s no point in building 10,000 widgets which will sit on a shelf somewhere until they’re obsolete (possibly after just six months) and get thrown out – or, even worse, issued to the ADF because there’s nothing else available.
So Defence’s acquisition system needs to be fundamentally rethought: exports and collaboration with like-minded nations are imperative; speed to capability is vital; and so is the creation of a Minimum Viable Capability (MVC) to get something into the hands of the ADF that is subsequently refined and enhanced in light of operational experience. Defence needs a little bit of materiel on the shelf – but it really needs hot production lines that can deliver whatever the circumstances require.
By the way – UXVs are much cheaper than anything crewed, so although we’re spending just $7 billion over the next decade on UAVs and C-UAS systems, compared with what we’re spending on submarines and surface ships, we’re likely to get pretty good value for money.
World War or Cold War?
All of these things are happening, and they are (as far as I can see) good things. There’s a need for secrecy, which everybody gets, especially as the war drums beat louder: Australia could be at war within 12 months, or living with a new cold war for the next 40 years, so you don’t want to give away your country’s secrets.
But you wouldn’t know about any of this from listening to Defence: the department won’t state, argue or defend its case and then wonders why taxpayers and commentators express no confidence in it. It is possible to discuss capability plans in general terms without giving away anything of value, and the US are past masters at doing this. We could do worse than copy them.
There is a difference between secrecy and secretiveness and the latter leads to cynicism and disbelief – and that’s where Australian commentators are at the moment.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are that of the author’s only, and do not necessarily represent the views of WA DEFENCE REVIEW.
About the Author:
Dr Gregor Ferguson is the former Editor of Australian Defence Magazine, publisher of EX2, runs the Innovation Awards program at the Avalon Air Show, Land Forces Expo and Pacific International Maritime Expo, and is a Director of Project Alpha Plus.